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This paper critically examines Hannah Arendt's claim that we should con-
ceive forgiveness as a specifically political or worldly virtue. According to
Arendt, the virtue of forgiveness is necessary if we are to halt the reactive
rancour that always threatens to destroy the space of politics. This paper sug-
gests that in building her case for the politics of forgiveness Arendt confus-
ingly intermingles three conceptual threads – mercy, Christian forgiveness
and forgiveness driven by eros. Drawing on Nietzsche's scattered analyses of
these threads, it argues that all three of these modalities of forgiveness jeop-
ardize rather than restore the circuits of mutual recognition that are integral
to democratic communities. Nietzsche shows that these shadings of uncondi-
tional or unilateral forgiveness do not necessarily arise from a will to live to-
gether, as Arendt assumes, but are anchored in and oriented by our need to
console ourselves for the narcissistic wounding we inevitably suffer in the
struggle for recognition.
Introduction
The recent emergence of the idea and practice of political reconciliation has brought
renewed attention to the place of mercy, forgiveness and love in public life. Well be-
fore the birth of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and sorry days, Hannah
Arendt, in her magnum opus, The Human Condition, asserted that we should conceive
forgiveness as a specifically political or worldly virtue. In a work that has since be-
come part of the canon of modern political philosophy, she argues that the virtue of
forgiveness is necessary if we are to halt the reactive rancour that always threatens to
destroy the space of politics. Although she acknowledges the Christian roots of the
idea of forgiveness, she nevertheless claims that it is an ‘authentic political experi-
ence’, which we can take ‘seriously in a strictly secular sense’ (Arendt, 1958:
238-239). Once we strip it of its theological aura, she believes we can legitimately de-
fend forgiveness – along with promising – as one of the ontological conditions of po-
litical action (Arendt, 1958: 236-247).
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Arendt's conception of inter-human forgive-
1 I would like to thank Michael Janover, Christopher Hamilton and the SAJP's anonymous referees for
their thoughtful and incisive comments.
ness has been marshalled in the context of understanding, interpreting and supporting
what we have come to know as the politics of reconciliation and its restorative rather
than retributive mode of justice (see for example, Schaap, 2003). For Arendt an ethics
of forgiveness is vital to restoring a community of political equals after the condition
of isonomy has been ruptured by acts of violence or disrespect. Without forgiveness as
a circuit-breaker, she fears, political actors all too easily find themselves entrapped in
an unending cycle of transgression and vengeance. On this basis, Arendt argues that
forgiveness is necessary if we are to establish and maintain a political sphere that al-
lows agents the paradoxical kind of non-sovereign freedom that she conceives as
unique to this domain of human experience and action.
Arendt's claim that forgiveness is an ontological condition of action obscures the
fact that this condition is only realised through individual victims deciding to turn the
other cheek rather than pursue retributive justice. If we are to comprehend forgiveness,
in other words, we need to more than simply attribute it to a reified “faculty of action”.
We need to analyse how and why victims make the politically and ethically charged
decision to forgo their legitimate claims for justice. By explaining forgiveness as an
ontological condition, Arendt short-circuits an investigation of the psychological or af-
fective grounds that explain why individuals might make this moral choice.2 Only by
understanding these grounds, as I argue, can we begin to differentiate between particu-
lar modes of forgiveness and critically evaluate their political implications.
Yet despite – or perhaps because of – the political premium she places on this virtue,
Arendt skirts the issue of the psychological motives that might underpin and explain
our willingness to overcome resentment and forgive. On this score, she merely specu-
lates in passing that the moral precept of forgiving arises ‘directly out of the will to
live together’ (Arendt, 1958: 246). Nietzsche's interpretative art of suspicion targets
precisely this kind of naïve, uncritical assumption that moral phenomena must origi-
nate from such noble values. Through what he calls the ‘chemistry’ of moral sensa-
tions, he attempts to expose how even ‘our most magnificent colours have been ex-
tracted from base, even despised materials’ (Nietzsche, 1995: §1). Among many other
moral sensations, he applies this method of ‘chemical’ analysis to forgiveness.3
If we bring together his reflections on forgiveness we discover that in each case, he
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2 Arendt is not alone in her desire to draw a shroud over the psychological underpinnings of forgiveness.
Jacques Derrida, for example, goes so far as to claim that forgiveness belongs to a “zone of experience”
that “remains inaccessible”. See Derrida (2001: 55).
3 At first glance, aphorisms like The Wanderer and His Shadow 68 might seem to suggest that Nietzsche
in fact shares a conception of forgiveness with Arendt:
Whether we are able to forgive. – How can one forgive them at all, if they know what they do! One has
nothing whatever to forgive – But does a man ever know completely what he does? And if this must al-
ways remain questionable, then men never have anything to forgive another and pardoning is for the
most rational man a thing impossible ...
Nietzsche's point here, however, concerns the logical presuppositions of forgiveness. Far from
endorsing forgiveness, he claims that it rests on untenable presuppositions about the human ca-
pacity for agency. His key point is that the concept of forgiveness can only apply to human af-
fairs if we can attribute our injuries to responsible agents. We can only forgive those who we
rightly believe are responsible for their actions. If, however, as Nietzsche clearly assumes, hu-
man beings are never fully responsible for their actions, then the idea of forgiveness is nonsen-
sical. Forgiving is impossible for the rational man because there simply is no one to forgive, so
to speak. Or to put Nietzsche's point another way, it is as irrational to speak of forgiving other
human beings as it to say that we forgive an avalanche for sweeping us away. Contra Arendt,
then, Nietzsche argues that, strictly speaking, if we accept Jesus’ claim that “they know not
what they do” (Luke 23:32-34), then the very idea of forgiveness is absurd. Nietzsche's inten-
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claims that it is our wounded vanity we are trying to soothe when we abandon or
check our resentment towards those whose actions have damaged our self-respect and
made us painfully aware of our vulnerabilities and dependencies. Nietzsche is un-
doubtedly one of the great analysts of narcissism. ‘Nietzsche’ as Elliott Jurist points
out, ‘demands that we take into account narcissism, not that we endorse it’ (Jurist,
2000: 220). It is this critical focus on narcissism that makes him such an acute thinker
of forgiveness and revenge. For forgiveness, of course, comes into play precisely
when others damage our narcissistic sense of self-sufficiency. If Nietzsche is right, our
vanity or narcissism reaches its highest pitch, and we seek the most extreme remedies
or therapeia when others wound us. Nietzsche makes this point in a little squib at
Kant's expense:
The human ‘thing in itself’. – The thing most vulnerable and yet most uncon-
querable is human vanity: indeed, its strength increases, and can in the end be-
come giant, through being wounded (1991: 46).
Nietzsche assumes, to put his point in psychoanalytic terms, that we only ever modu-
late and transform, never abandon our wish to recover our absolutely self-sufficient
narcissism. Vanity, he claims, is unconquerable. While he acknowledges that our entry
into social life and moral relations might begin with a decentering of primary narcis-
sism, he also recognises that this personal ‘Copernican revolution’, so to speak, is al-
ways accompanied by efforts to recoup our losses, often in and through the relations
we forge with others (see Ure, 2005). Our incorrigible narcissism, he argues, leads us
to seek out various consolations for the painful decentering of our personal universe.
According to Nietzsche, whenever we are deeply wounded, we seek to reclaim a bliss-
ful state of imagined independence from uncontrollable others. This is significant, be-
cause Nietzsche claims that it is often a desire for one or another kind of narcissistic
consolation, not a will to live together, that motivates our acts of forgiveness. In other
words, for Nietzsche forgiveness is a therapy for narcissistic wounding. Or more pre-
cisely, he identifies what we might call unconditional or unilateral kinds of forgive-
ness – that is, forgiveness granted regardless of whether or not perpetrators repent or
undergo any kind of moral transformation – as extreme therapies. They are extreme in
the sense that through them, we make a wholesale retreat from the struggle for recog-
nition into a state of (imagined) narcissistic self-sufficiency.
Nietzsche differentiates at least three motivational complexes that account for this
kind of unconditional or unilateral willingness to relinquish retributive anger and re-
sentment, each of which is oriented around our desire to console ourselves for the loss
of our narcissistic self-sufficiency. If we systematise Nietzsche's scattered comments,
we can identify these three distinct complexes as mercy, forgiveness based on Chris-
tian agape, and forgiveness driven by erotic attachment.4 All three of these conceptual
threads are present, indeed often confusingly intermingled in Arendt's analysis; a fact
tion is to deflate Christian forgiveness by way of this reductio ad absurdum. By the same logic,
of course, he also suggests that vengeance and punishment are equally irrational. According to
Nietzsche, at least in his middle period, once we have recognised the absurdity of forgiveness or
punishment, what ought to take their place is a quasi-Stoic apatheia. Nietzsche, then, quotes
Luke 23:32-34 not to endorse Christian forgiveness, as Arendt does, but to shows its absurdity
and point to an alternative remedy for our wounds – Stoic 'coolness' (see 1991: 1, 34).
4 The relevant texts treated in this paper are Genealogy of Morals I.10 & II.10, The Wanderer & His
Shadow 33, 34, The Anti-Christ 30, 35; see also Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II.3 and Ecce Homo, 'Why I
Am So Wise', 6.
testified to by the wildly conflicting interpretations her notion of forgiveness has gen-
erated. By explaining how overcoming resentment can serve as a means of securing
some form of narcissistic consolation, Nietzsche enables us to draw clear analytic dis-
tinctions between these different modes of unilateral forgiveness.
More importantly, his explanation also gives us plausible grounds for scepticism re-
garding Arendt's claim that transcending justice in the name of forgiveness – or at
least in the name of these unilateral modes of forgiveness – is essential to sustaining or
restoring democratic political communities. Contra Arendt, Nietzsche argues that
these kinds of unilateral forgiveness are personal therapies – ‘a kind of hygiene’ – that
are neither based on, nor promote a will to live together (Nietzsche, 1969b: 6). As
Jiwei Ci puts it, drawing directly on Nietzsche, ‘(forgiveness) may well promote the
well-being of individuals by relieving them of the negative affects of resentment and
yet may not necessarily promote the social cause of justice’ (Ci, 2006: 188). As we
shall see, Nietzsche shows how, through unilateral forgiveness, individuals seek to
flee from the agon of recognition into imagined states of narcissistic self-sufficiency.
They do so because it is the struggle for recognition that makes them vulnerable to be-
ing wounded by and resentful of others. If, as Arendt and others claim, the struggle for
recognition is a central feature of democracy, then unilateral forgiveness, as a retreat
from such struggle, is also a retreat from the relational conditions of democratic partic-
ipation.5
We can see how Nietzsche throws a sidelight on Arendt's political hopes by unpack-
ing in turn his analysis of mercy, Christian forgiveness, and forgiveness driven by
eros. As we shall see, if he is correct, each of these shadings of ‘forgiveness’, which
Arendt leans on at different points in her analysis, carries serious dangers for any poli-
tics concerned with sustaining democratic communities, or restoring them in the after-
math of civil conflict.
Mercy
Initially in The Wanderer and his Shadow (1879) and later in the Genealogy of Morals
(1886), Nietzsche attempts to fathom mercy as one distinct mode of overcoming re-
tributive anger and resentment. In origin and temper, as Nietzsche recognises, mercy is
a Roman political virtue par excellence. Augustine highlights this point: ‘Did not
Sallust praise the Romans for having chosen to forget injuries rather than punish the
offender? Did not Cicero praise Caesar because he was wont to forget nothing but the
wrongs done to him?’ (quoted in Shriver, 1995: 242). In glossing the political history
of ideas and practices of pardoning and amnesty, Arendt suggests that the Roman prin-
ciple of sparing the vanquished (parcere subiectis) is the earliest ‘rudimentary sign’ of
Christianity's political discovery that forgiveness is ‘the necessary corrective for the
inevitable damages resulting from action’ (Arendt, 1958: 239).
This is a puzzling claim, since the Roman principle does not involve releasing tres-
passers from wrongs, but sparing the vanquished complete annihilation. It can hardly
be said, therefore, to be a portent of forgiveness. If there is any foreshadowing of
Christian forgiveness in Roman antiquity, it lies not in the principle of parcere
subiectis, but in the Roman Stoic concept of mercy. Arendt comes close to acknowl-
edging this when she adds that we should also see ‘the right to commute the death sen-
tence’, which is ‘probably also of Roman origin’, as a rudimentary sign of forgiveness.
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In On Mercy, the locus classicus on this topic, Seneca identifies mercy with the right
to commute the death sentence and with mitigation in sentencing more generally. It
seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that Arendt is better understood as claiming
that the Stoic concept of mercy prefigures Christian forgiveness, rather than the princi-
ple of sparing the vanquished, which pertains to a conqueror's relation to the con-
quered, not a victim's relation to a perpetrator.
Indeed, some Arendt interpreters go so far as to claim that it is actually something
akin to this Roman notion of mercy, rather than the Christian model of forgiveness,
that she conceives of as the ontological condition of political action. This claim finds
particular favour among those keen to identify Arendt's notion of action with a Machi-
avellian or a (quasi-) Nietzschean sense of virtù or virtuosity (see Vila, 1992; Honig,
1993). Bonnie Honig, for example, silently edits out Arendt's own identification of the
Christian Gospels as the source of her understanding of forgiveness. She claims that
Arendt in fact rejects ‘the moral practice’ of forgiveness (Honig, 1993: 86). Like
Nietzsche, she argues, Arendt conceives Christian forgiveness as too ‘vengeful’ inso-
far as it enmeshes the perpetrator in a relationship of indebtedness to the victim (1993:
86).6 Despite Arendt's explicit dependence on the Christian Gospels’ concept of for-
giveness, then, Honig claims that it would be closer to the truth to say that Arendt re-
lies on the notion of mercy that Nietzsche analyses in the Genealogy of Morals.
In fact, Honig explicitly identifies Arendt's ethic with the kind of mercy exercised
by the masters Nietzsche fantasises in the Genealogy of Morals (1.10). ‘Arendt's theo-
risation of forgiveness’, as she puts it, ‘recalls not the imperatives of [Christian] mor-
alists but the indifference of ... lords and their lordly practice of dismissing ... Indiffer-
ent to trespasses, they dismiss them without ceremony in what might be called a pro-
cess of constant mutual release’ (1993: 86).7 This interpretation of Arendt as an advo-
cate of the type of mercy exercised by sovereign, self-sufficient subjects has some
merit insofar as she sometimes expresses significant reservations about using the con-
cept of forgiveness because of its theological and emotional baggage. Rather than
identifying the action of releasing as forgiveness she prefers to describe it as a ‘dis-
missing, in order to make it possible for life to go on’ (Arendt, 1958: 240). In Arendt's
sense of the term, dismissing amounts to releasing trespassers so that they may once
again act, or exercise the power ‘to begin something new’, without requiring that they
do penance or undergo a moral conversion (Arendt, 1958: 240). However, the capacity
to dismiss injuries requires agents whose indifference to injury is so great that they can
6 One might well think that it is perverse to describe forgiveness as “vengeful” on the grounds that it may
require perpetrators of gross human rights violations to confess their guilt, repent and offer reparations.
Honig's case, which she takes to be distinctively Nietzschean, rests on the assertion that the notion of a
morally responsible subject, a doer behind the deed, is a metaphysical fiction, the weak construct in or-
der to disable the strong.
7 In her closing comments Honig belatedly recognises that this lordly shrug of indifference cannot
achieve what Arendt desires, viz., the healing and reconstitution of relationships between equals. Lordly
indifference to others is hardly the basis for establishing relationships of mutual recognition! For this
reason, Honig is compelled to dramatically qualify, if not retract, her claim that Arendt's celebrates
Nietzsche's lordly mercy. Arendt's tribute to Nietzsche's masters, she writes, is “cautious and not with-
out reservations” (1993: 87), though since this claim lacks any textual basis, she cannot elaborate the
exact nature of these reservations. Honig paints herself into a corner: having canvassed two kinds of vir-
tues that might free political agents from being entrapped in the consequences of their own actions,
(Christian) forgiveness and (Roman) mercy, and dismissed both on political grounds, the former as too
vengeful, and the latter as too callous, she leaves both herself and Arendt with no exit routes.
slough off their resentments without ceremony – without conventional legal remedies
or even the cathartic therapy of truth commissions.
Nietzsche's dissection of this kind of mercy demonstrates that it neither derives from
a ‘will to live together’, nor serves to restore relationships of mutual recognition be-
tween citizens. In fact, as we shall see, he exposes mercy as a virtue that serves to re-
store an order of rank. For Nietzsche, mercy certainly illustrates one way of overcom-
ing retributive anger, but it is not the kind of overcoming that can create the reciprocal,
democratic political relations that form the core of Arendt's political vision. According
to Nietzsche, if social institutions and individuals exercise mercy, they pay no heed to
restoring trespassers to the status of equal citizens in the public sphere. Rather, he ar-
gues that mercy is a demonstration and reinforcement of a condition of sovereign in-
vulnerability to injury.
Nietzsche identifies two insurmountable difficulties with the practice of mercy as a
way of restoring mutual recognition and reciprocity between political actors. We can
clarify his argument by distinguishing between mercy exercised by a third party and
mercy in the context of dyadic relations. In the first case, he argues that when a third
party, like a sovereign monarch or the judiciary, grant clemency to perpetrators, it does
so at the expense of victims. In this context, mercy confronts us with the obvious prob-
lem that it rides roughshod over the demands of justice; it is, as Nietzsche says, ‘be-
yond the law’, or a kind of lawless exceptionalism that pays no heed to the right of
victims to re-establish their equal standing through legal remedies and penalties
(Nietzsche, 1969a: II.10).8 By exercising clemency monarchs and magistrates certainly
demonstrate their own majesty and nobility, but they do not thereby make good the
losses sustained by the victims. Mercy does not ‘season justice’, as Portia claims in
The Merchant of Venice; it contravenes it (IV, 1, 197).
It is for this reason, as Nietzsche recognises, ‘that no bench of judges may conscien-
tiously practice mercy’ if it aims to fulfil the principle of restoring equilibrium (Nietz-
sche, 1991: 2.2 §34). If the judiciary were to practice mercy, in other words, it must
flaunt the right of victims to have any infringements of their status as free individuals
acknowledged and to have this status restored through the imposition of penalties on
their trespassers. In cases where third parties grant amnesty or pardon to perpetrators
on behalf of victims, these victims have no means of recouping their losses. This is
precisely the criticism often levelled at South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission, on the basis of its decision to grant amnesty in exchange for full disclosure.
By exercising mercy through its amnesty provision, the TRC unjustly places the bur-
den of dealing with past violence on the victims rather than on those responsible for
apartheid, by giving the former no choice but to accept their losses (see Nagy, 2002:
8-9).
In the second place, Nietzsche argues that, if we examine the significance of mercy
from the perspective of individual agents who grant it to their trespassers, we will see
that it is founded on a sovereignty (or better still, it is an attempt to establish such a
state of sovereignty) that is profoundly at odds with mutual recognition. He takes aim
at accounts of mercy like those found in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, which as-
sume that it is a reciprocal blessing:
The quality of mercy is not strained;/It droppeth as the gentle rain from
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heaven/Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest:/It blesses him that gives and
him that takes (IV, I, 184-186).
Martha Nussbaum elaborates Shakespeare's gentle interpretation of mercy. Mercy, she
maintains, is ‘respect for others’ that flows from ‘a powerful and secure nature’ able to
‘waive the pleasure of retribution and ‘overcome itself’ in the direction of gentleness’
(Nussbaum, 2001: 367).9
In the context of dyadic relationships, Nietzsche, by contrast, argues that mercy is in
fact only a blessing for those who grant it, not for those who receive it. If he is correct,
we should not conceive mercy as an altruistic virtue, but as a virtue of pride, through
which we restore ourselves to invulnerable self-sufficiency and by the same stroke cast
out the offender from the circuits of mutual recognition. The fact that Augustine
counts mercy as one of Caesar's virtues should already alert us to its potential dangers.
‘Mercy’ as Nietzsche explains ‘(is one of the) virtues of rulers bearing the sense: ‘I am
sufficiently powerful to put up with this palpable sense of loss, this is proof of my
power'’ (Nietzsche, 1991: §34).
Nietzsche conceives mercy, then, as a virtue through which rulers attempt to con-
struct, or more truthfully perhaps, reconstruct a sense of their own sovereignty after it
has suffered damage; they do so by dismissing perpetrators as impotent inferiors un-
able to inflict significant harm. Through the act of mercy, rulers remind those who at-
tack them of their impotence, and in doing so, remind themselves of their own po-
tency. The merciful ruler does not think of revenge “because”, Nietzsche explains, he
‘despises perpetrator(s) ... because as people he despises, they cannot accord him hon-
our and consequently cannot take any honour from him either’ (Nietzsche, 1991, 2.2
§33).
If Nietzsche is correct, the aim of mercy is not to establish a Stoic or proto-Kantian
kingdom of ends, but quite the opposite: its aim and attractiveness consists in restoring
an order of rank between the sovereign and the impotent, the honourable and the de-
spised. Through mercy we sooth the injuries others inflict on our narcissistic self-suffi-
ciency by denying them recognition as individuals on a par with ourselves; our sense
of potency turns on treating them as impotent, even comic figures of ridicule. Far from
treating their perpetrators with gentle benevolence, Nietzsche suggests that the merci-
ful take renewed pleasure in themselves by dismissively laughing away the raging re-
sentment of the impotent. Nietzsche memorably illustrates how mercy works as a balm
to our narcissism by short-circuiting those networks of recognition and memory that
makes us vulnerable to others:
To be incapable of taking one's enemies ... seriously very long – that is a sign
of a strong, full nature in whom there is an excess of plastic power to form, to
mold, to recuperate, and to forget (a good example in modern times is
Mirabeau, who has no memory for insults and vile actions done to him and was
unable to forgive simply because he – forgot). Such a man shakes off with a
single shrug many worms that eat deep into others ... (Nietzsche, 1994: I.10)
We can see that Mirabeau's bravado in forgetting his enemies, which one suspects can
9 Nussbaum argues that, in the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche himself gives an eloquent defence of the
Stoic notion of mercy and the vision of political community it carries – namely an early version of the
Kantian kingdom of ends (see Nussbaum, 1994: 139-167). Whether Nussbaum is right to identify Nietz-
sche's ethics as a brand of Stoicism is beyond the scope of the current discussion; what is at stake here is
whether Nietzsche shares her conception of mercy as a virtue of reciprocity.
only be false bravado – although Nietzsche seems oddly and uncharacteristically blind
to this self-deception – is only possible because he transforms these enemies into
“worms” who cannot get under his skin – or who do so only once before they are
shaken off with, as Nietzsche emphasises, a single shrug. In other words, Mirabeau's
mercy turns on denying that how others perceive or act towards oneself can actively
constitute one's identity, or shape one's emotional landscape. This retreat into an illu-
sion of narcissistic self-sufficiency in the face of the perils of intersubjectivity may
well work as a perverse kind of therapy, but its paranoid construction of a world di-
vided between humans and worms does not, needless to say, restore trespassers to ac-
tive, respected, equal citizens. Nor, we might add, does its flight from the risks associ-
ated with the agon of recognition count as a sign of strength, even, or especially, by
Nietzsche's own standards. In any case, mercy on his analysis is not the virtue Arendt
requires, since rather than restoring mutual recognition – the foundation of democratic
community – it reinforces an order of rank between the honourable and the despised.
Later in the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche returns to the topic of mercy, and anal-
yses it as a specifically political virtue. Here he underscores the view that mercy is
premised on a flight from our dependency on recognition from others, one we try to
achieve through repairing the breach in the order of rank that had hitherto secured us
against our vulnerability and fragility before others:
The ‘creditor’ always becomes more humane to the extent that he has grown
richer; finally, how much injury he can endure without suffering from it be-
comes the actual measure of his wealth. It is not unthinkable that a society
might attain such a consciousness of power that it could allow itself the noblest
luxury possible to it – letting those who harm it go unpunished. ‘What are my
parasites to me?’ it might say. ‘May they live and prosper: I am strong enough
for that!’ ... This self-overcoming of justice: one knows the beautiful name it
has given itself – mercy; it goes without saying that mercy remains the privilege
of the most powerful man, or better, his – beyond the law (Nietzsche, 1969a:
II.10)
Nietzsche assumes here that, through mercy, individuals isolate themselves from the
travails of recognition by diminishing others to the status of non-subjects, ‘worms’ or
‘parasites’ who, as such, cannot deprive them of recognition or honour. This point is
evident in the rhetorical question Nietzsche poses: ‘'What are my parasites to me?’
[the merciful] might ask’. The answer obviously and chillingly is nothing. Nietzsche's
analysis of mercy as a flight into narcissistic self-sufficiency through the ‘abjection’ of
others echoes the very first discourse on this topic in the Western canon, Seneca's es-
say, On Mercy, which, is addressed to one of history's greatest narcissists, the young
Roman emperor, Nero. ‘Some you would be glad to spare, against others you would
disdain to assert your rights, and you would forbear to touch them as you would to
touch little insects which defile your hands when you crush them’ (Seneca, 1995:
I.22). We might speculate that Seneca's failure to cure Nero of his monstrous narcis-
sism might not only have been due to this psychopathology, but also to the fact that
mercy as a virtue of pride only served to further undermine Nero's respect for others.
Forgiveness and Christian Agape
Perhaps it is such considerations as these that compelled Arendt to lean more heavily
on the Christian gospel of forgiveness, rather than Roman mercy, in her search for a
solution to cycles of violence and resentment. One of the questions left over from
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Nietzsche's analysis of mercy is whether it is possible for us to become ‘more humane’
without needing to ascend to the lofty plane of absolute self-sufficiency, without a
growing consciousness of power and wealth that ensures that we will not suffer from
the injuries others inflict on us. Can we become more humane and overcome our re-
sentments without needing to consign our trespassers to the realm of parasites, worms
or little insects we disdain to crush? Derrida sees this as the fundamental question of
forgiveness, since ‘a forgiveness worthy of its name’, as he puts it, ‘would be a for-
giveness without power ... without sovereignty’ (Derrida, 2001: 59).
Arendt turns to the Christian Gospels in order to identify and defend a mode of for-
giving without power or sovereignty.10 Contesting the claim, ancient and modern, that
Christianity is an intense moral individualism concerned with ‘the ‘one thing needful’
... the absolute importance of eternal personal salvation’, as Nietzsche puts it, she
claims that the Jesus of Nazareth made significant political discoveries, none more so
than his teachings of forgiveness (Nietzsche, 1982: §132). Arendt applauds Jesus for
challenging the reigning theological orthodoxy that forgiveness is a divine prerogative
in the name of his scandalous commitment to inter-human forgiveness (Arendt, 1958:
239). As she understands it, Jesus’ political revolution lay in discrediting the vertical,
theological picture of divine forgiveness and replacing it with a horizontal, political
conception that affirms forgiveness as a doorway through which members of fractured
communities can come together and re-establish intra-communal harmony (Shriver,
1995: 38-45). Jesus’ political importance, she claims, lies in tipping the vertical axis of
prayer for God's grace into the horizontal axis of inter-human forgiveness.
Although Arendt builds her case almost exclusively on the Gospels, she tries to dis-
tance her politics of forgiveness from its roots in love or agape.11 Despite her best ef-
forts, however, what she calls the Christian assumption that “only love can forgive”,
with its embrace of loving one's enemies, remains entrenched in her position. After
having built her entire analysis of forgiveness entirely on the relevant passages from
the Christian Gospels, Arendt tries to back-pedal and distance herself from the claim
that forgiveness turns on victims extending Christian love to perpetrators. She does so
by claiming that forgiveness between citizens arises from respect rather than love.
However, as James Bernauer suggests, Arendt's terminological shift does not establish
a significant conceptual distinction between love and respect (Bernauer, 1987: 15). As
Arendt describes them, love and respect are indistinguishable. Just as Christian love
entails forgiving others because of who they are (or might become), ‘respect’ between
citizens entails exactly the same thing: ‘forgiving ... what a person did, for the sake of
the person’ (Arendt, 1958: 243). In other words, what Arendt calls ‘respect’, functions
in a manner identical to Christian love: it forgives others for what they have done be-
cause of who they are.12 At least tacitly, then, she assumes that Christian agape is nec-
essary if we are to establish and maintain a political sphere that allows agents the para-
10 While Arendt and Derrida agree that a forgiveness worthy of its name precludes the sense of sover-
eignty or invulnerability that underpins and explains acts of mercy, they disagree over the limits of for-
giveness. Derrida controversially claims that forgiveness ought to extend to all acts , whereas Arendt ar-
gues that some crimes against humanity – radical evils – are unforgivable. Michael Janover lucidly
analyses this philosophical and ethical dispute (see Janover, 2005: 221-235)
11 Arendt draws on the following Gospel passages: Luke 5:21-24, 7:49, 17:3-4; Mark 11:25, 12:7-10; Mat-
thew 6:14-15, 9:4-6; 16:27, 18:35.
12 Such is Arendt's failure to sustain this distinction between love and respect, that Julia Kristeva unwit-
tingly overlooks it and assumes that, for Arendt, love alone is the source of forgiveness. “Hannah
Arendt”, she writes, “[believes] forgiveness is aimed at the person, and not the act ... By being aimed at
someone and not something, forgiveness becomes an act of love” (Kristeva, 2001: 232).
doxical kind of non-sovereign freedom that she conceives as unique to this domain of
human experience and action.
Yet Christianity's loving forgiveness is fraught with dangers for the project of re-
storing a community of political equals, ruptured by acts of violence or disrespect. In
his analysis of Christianity, Nietzsche suggests that its mode of loving forgiveness
must cut against the Arendtian hope that it might be the key to restoring a vibrant pub-
lic sphere of equal citizens engaged in contests over recognition and distinction. Nietz-
sche's psychological dissection of primitive Christianity shows how its mode of for-
giveness is part of a full-scale retreat from, rather than a restoration of the struggle for
recognition.
In his treatment of primitive Christianity, Nietzsche suggests that its ethic of for-
giveness is the exact reverse image of Roman mercy. If Caesar asks, ‘What are my
parasites to me?’, the Christian asks “Who am I that I should resist my enemies?’. In
other words, Nietzsche argues that, although both mercy and forgiveness soothe our
narcissistic wounds, they do so in very different ways. On his analysis, then, both vir-
tues enable us to avoid the traumatic emotional upheavals that arise in the struggle for
recognition – anger, resentment, envy and so on. By exercising mercy or forgiveness,
we avoid being eaten from within by these emotions that painfully register our un-
avoidable dependence on others. Through mercy we reclaim a sense of self-sufficiency
by denying recognition to others; they become superfluous ‘worms’, whose attacks
cannot damage our honour. Through forgiveness, by contrast, we remove ourselves
from the possibility of further suffering by denying our own need for recognition; we
become passive, unresisting objects yielding to others without condition or resentment.
According to Nietzsche, the secret pleasure of this masochistic self-denial lies in al-
lowing us to revert to a ‘blessed’ or painless state of repose, an absence of resistance
to the painful stimulus that streams in from the external world.13 If mercy is premised
on an ascent to a lofty plane of invulnerability, forgiveness is premised on a descent
into the perverse pleasures of abject humility. Mercy is a virtue of pride, forgiveness
of humility.
The difficulty Nietzsche confronts in his analysis of Christian agape and its love of
enemies to the point of unconditional forgiveness, is analogous to this difficulty he has
fathoming the high value we moderns (at least as represented by Rousseau and
Schopenhauer) give to pity. According to Nietzsche, when we allow ourselves to be-
come objects of pity, we also make ourselves objects of contempt (Nietzsche, 1991:
2.2 §50). Similarly, he believes that, in order to practise the Christian ethic of forgive-
ness we must engage in masochistic self-denial and a denial of our rights. ‘(Jesus)
does not resist’, Nietzsche writes ‘he does not defend his rights, he takes no steps to
avert the worst that can happen to him – more he provokes it ... Not to defend oneself,
not to grow angry, not to make responsible ... not to resist the evil man – to love him
...’ (Nietzsche, 1968: §35) .
Kantians too rail against Christian forgiveness as an irrational assault on our self-re-
spect, but Nietzsche goes further by attempting to explain the origins and motives of a
self-abasement that consists in loving precisely those who deny us recognition (see
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13 Freud claims that this is a recurrent response to narcissistic wounding: ”(B)y being born we have made
the step from an absolutely self-sufficient narcissism to the perception of a changing external world and
the beginnings of the discovery of objects. And with this is associated the fact that we cannot endure the
new state of things for long, that we periodically revert from it, in our sleep, to our former condition of
absence of stimulation and avoidance of objects (Freud, 1989: 80)
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Murphy, 1988). While Christians forgive their persecutors ostensibly from ‘love’, ac-
cording to Nietzsche, this love of one's enemies itself is symptomatic of a desire to at-
tain a state of repose beyond all struggle and resistance, including the struggle for rec-
ognition. If he is right, to love one's enemies in the Christian way simply means that
one has successfully abolished all resistance, all struggle to attain or reclaim due rec-
ognition from those who refuse it.
As Nietzsche learned from Schopenhauer, the price we must pay for seeking to
soothe our narcissistic wounds by reverting to a state of will-lessness is complete
self-abasement and self-mortification. He understands the Christian love of one's ene-
mies as merely an element in a cure by self-mortification; it is the flipside of a com-
plete absence of desire. One ‘loves’ one's enemies, and forgives them their trespasses,
in other words, so that one does not have to suffer the displeasure of engaging in the
struggle for recognition. Here is how Nietzsche sums up primitive Christianity's radi-
cal therapy, which consists in severing all of those emotional investments and orienta-
tions that would otherwise fuel acts of resistance to the harm others inflict on us when
they refuse to recognise us as independent agents:
Instinctive exclusion of all aversion, all enmity ... consequence of an extreme
capacity for suffering and irritation ... which already feels all resisting, all need
for resistance, as an unbearable displeasure ... and knows blessedness (plea-
sure) only in no longer resisting anyone or anything, neither the evil or the evil-
doer – love as the sole, as the last possibility of life (Nietzsche, 1968: §30).
If Nietzsche's analysis is correct, then Arendt is mistaken to hold that Christian for-
giveness is an interpersonal act animated by the desire to end the cycles of vengeance
that prevent citizens engaging with one another in the public sphere; it is rather a
moral standard drawn from a private relationship ‘between me and myself’ (Arendt,
1958: 237)14. On closer inspection, the Christian precept of forgiveness springs from
the beggar's dream of living in the world without suffering, without enduring the dis-
pleasure we incur through the struggle for recognition, rather than arising, as Arendt
holds, ‘directly out of the will to live together’ (Arendt, 1958: 246). Contra Arendt,
the Christian model of forgiveness is fundamentally anti-political: it urges us to con-
sole ourselves for our worldly humiliations by a full-scale retreat from political en-
gagement, or the vita activa. From this Christian perspective, politics, at least as
Arendt understands it – as a space where we take pleasure in appearing before and
competing with others for recognition – is a precisely what we need to abolish to attain
a state of complete repose. In the context of Christianity, forgiving our trespassers is
merely one means among others of seeking escape from the agon of recognition.
Forgiveness and Eros
Forgiveness can spring from a love very different to Christian agape: the ‘raging
demon’, Eros (Nietzsche, 1974: §14). Even if, as we have seen, Arendt implicitly an-
chors her ethic of forgiveness in Christian agape, she also recognises that eros, which
she describes as a spell that enthrals lovers, is one of the most potent sources of for-
giveness. Curiously, however, although both agape and eros are present in her discus-
sion of the sources of forgiveness, she tends to run them together in her analysis, and
14 Avishai Margalit echoes this claim in his argument that forgiveness is a duty we owe to ourselves – one
that stems from not wanting to carry the burden of poisonous feelings of resentment and the desire for
revenge – and not a duty we owe to others (Margalit, 2002: 207)
in doing so, fails to make explicit the fact that they generate very different modalities
of forgiveness. It is worth dwelling on these differences so that we can specify their
political outcomes.
If, as Nietzsche suggests, Christian agape entails a total abolition of the will that re-
lieves us of the possibility of resenting or resisting our enemies, eros allows us to
overcome resentment and forgive another because, in doing so, we are indirectly pay-
ing homage to our own narcissistic ideal. As Nietzsche explains:
[The lover] will refrain from revenge in the not uncommon case that he loves
the perpetrator: he will thus lose honour in the perpetrator's eyes, to be sure,
and he will perhaps become less worthy of love in return. But to renounce even
all claim to love in return is a sacrifice he is prepared to make if only he does
not have to hurt the beloved being: this would mean hurting oneself more than
any sacrifice hurts (Nietzsche, 1991: §33).
Arendt, similarly, acknowledges that when we forgive out of love for others, we do so
because we are spellbound to the point that we are ‘unconcerned to the point of total
unworldliness’ about their ‘failings and transgressions’ (Arendt, 1958, 242). We can
understand Nietzsche's account of this self-abasing love that forgives others even
though they harm us, in terms of what Freud calls narcissistic idealisation – that is, as
the projection of our own unattained ego ideal into the loved object. In the case of
such narcissistic idealisation, our submission to the beloved, which, as Arendt ac-
knowledges, goes to the point of ‘being always willing to forgive him whatever he
may have done’, is submission to our own highest self (Arendt, 1958: 243, emphasis
added).
If, then, Christian agape takes us down the path of radical self-abnegation in order
to escape narcissistic wounding, eros consoles us for this wounding by preserving our
narcissistic perfection in the figure of the beloved into whom we have projected all our
fantasies of wholeness, perfection and inviolability. When lovers forgive, they do so
out of masochistic submission to the beloved who embodies their own long-abandoned
narcissistic grandiosity.
This way of soothing our narcissistic wounds carries with it, if possible, even grim-
mer political consequences than Christian agape. For not only are those under the
spell of eros prepared to abase or sacrifice themselves to the point of forgiving those
who harm them, which also applies to the good Christian; they are also willing to for-
give their narcissistic love object all the harm it does to others and to protect it from
their vengeful attacks. If Christian agape leads to what Nietzsche sees as the
tragic-comic idiocy of blessing our enemies, raging eros, enthralled by the image of its
own perfection, is prepared to forgive the beloved object everything, including the
worst crimes it commits against others. ‘Conscience’ as Freud explains this point, ‘has
no application to anything that is done for the sake of the object, in the blindness of
love remorselessness is carried to the pitch of crime’ (Freud, 1989: 57). We see this
eros in its political guise in individual and collective submission to a charismatic au-
thority, into which we have projected our narcissistic perfection. Under the spell of
this authority, we forgive it everything and protect it from all vengeance.
Conclusion
In summary, then, Nietzsche gives an account of three ways of overcoming resent-
ment and retributive anger, each anchored in and oriented by our need to console our-
selves for the narcissistic wounding we inevitably suffer in the struggle for recogni-
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tion. Contra Arendt's claim that forgiveness can counter the risk of political action and
restore the circuits of mutual recognition, Nietzsche's analysis of these modalities of
forgiveness shows that each in different ways works against the realisation of her vi-
sion of political action. Mercy reclaims a state of invulnerable sovereignty by banish-
ing others from the game of recognition, and in doing so reinforces an order of rank
between masters and slaves, the honourable and the despised. Christian agape defeats
resentment only at the price of a radical denial of our own need for recognition; it
leads to the abyss of self-abnegation and the collapse of any interest in worldly poli-
tics. Eros, finally, enables us to overcome retributive anger, but only for the sake of a
love object for which, because it embodies our lost narcissistic perfection, we are will-
ing to forgive everything, including the crimes it perpetrates against others.
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